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Abstract
Recent evidence suggests that aid induces migration. However, total migra-
tion is quite general from a policy perspective since what explains the welfare
consequences of migration is the extent of emigration selection. In this paper
we ask whether skilled or unskilled migration is more sensitive to aid and to the
diﬀerent mechanisms through which aid may aﬀect self-selection among interna-
tional emigrants. We show that aid induces positive selection. And that the eﬀect
on skilled migration is larger than the eﬀect on unskilled migration. As possible
mechanisms to explain the relation, we ﬁnd that aid induces skilled migration
by reducing transaction and information costs, by improving the distribution of
schooling, and by helping to overcome liquidity constraints.
KEYWORDS: Foreign aid, International migration, Self-selection, Brain
drain. JEL CLASSIFICATION: F35, F22, C23
1 Introduction
The international mobility of workers is perceived by several authors as a key issue in
economic development. South to north migration has increased over time and reached
very high levels. To give a broad idea of the situation, estimates from the Organization
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1for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2008), reveal that more than
one half of OECD countries have a stock of immigrants that exceeds 10% of their total
population. Many of these immigrants come from developing countries (LDCs) and
are relatively low skilled workers (i.e. with less than a tertiary education attainment).
However, as highlighted by Docquier and Marfouk (2006), the share of skilled migrants
is increasing over time. They estimate that between 1990 and 2000, the proportion of
skilled over total migrants raised from 25% to 29%.
The selection of international emigrants by education level is a central issue for both
research and policy analysis since its extents explains the migration’s positive and neg-
ative consequences for both sending and receiving countries. To caricature, we could
summarize the debate by asserting that migration hosting countries are interested in
managing low-skilled (and illegal) immigration while migration sending countries are
interested in retaining human capital by reducing the outﬂow of the highly skilled. The
desire of reducing low-skilled migration in OECD countries rests on the fact that, as
suggested by Drinkwater et al. (2007), the gains from immigration (the so-called immi-
gration surplus) increase proportionally to the level of training of the immigrants. The
reason is that low skilled immigration lowers the low-skilled wage in hosting countries
(Borjas, 2003) and, by ﬁlling the shortage of low skilled-workers, it reduces the working
possibilities for lowly qualiﬁed native workers (Borjas, 2006). Furthermore, less skilled
migrants pay less taxes and have a higher propensity to receive welfare beneﬁts than
native households, Lee and Miller (2000). They increase therefore the net tax burden
on the natives.
In order to deal with these disequilibria, it has been suggested that, to reduce un-
wanted migration, it could be necessary for OECD countries to target some of their de-
velopment aid speciﬁcally to migration (see for example B¨ ohning and Schloeter-Paredes,
1994, IOM and UNCTAD, 1996, Stalker, 2002, Lowell and Findlay, 2006, and OECD,
2008). The underlying idea being that aid would act against the alleged root causes of
migration.
2From the perspective of LDCs, the problem is diﬀerent. They are concerned by the
emigration of the highly skilled. Even if the debate is ongoing, see Mountford (1997),
and Beine et al. (2001), most authors view brain drain as a threat for four main reasons.
First, following Bhagwati and Hamada (1974), through skilled migration LDCs would
indirectly ﬁnance (part of) the human capital formation of foreign countries. Second,
highly skilled individuals do not participate in their home country economic activity.
Third, skilled migration induces distortions on the sending labour market, which results
in a decrease in welfare. Finally, based on the endogenous growth literature, Haque and
Kim (1995) and Wong and Yip (1999), suggest that brain drain reduces human capital
formation and consequently long-term growth.
Given the fear of LDCs of losing their most skilled workers and the general negative
perception of brain drain, many international organizations have proposed to using
foreign aid as a policy alternative to reduce skilled migration (see UNCTAD, 2007, and
Lowell and Findlay, 2006).
To summarize, international organizations see aid as a powerful tool to diminish
both unskilled and skilled migration and, thus, meet the migratory objectives of both
rich and poor countries.
The evidence about the eﬀectiveness of this instrument to reduce migration suggests
an opposite eﬀect. Examples are case studies such as Faini and Venturini (1993) for
Greece, Portugal, Spain and Turkey, Rotte and Vogler (2000) for Germany, and recently
Berth´ elemy et al. (2009), who in a cross-section sample by estimating jointly aid
and migration in a simultaneous equation system show that aid and migration are
complements. However, total migration is quite general from a policy perspective since
what explains the welfare consequences of migration for both sending and receiving
countries is the extent of emigration selection. By contrast, there has been practically
no systematic empirical assessment to check what kind of migration (skilled and/or
unskilled) aid eﬀectively reduces. As a consequence, the relation between aid and
migration selection remains rife with open questions.
3In this paper we assess the eﬀectiveness of foreign aid to reach its migration objec-
tives, and investigate the impact of aid on the schooling gap between emigrants and non
emigrants (migration selection), and on the skill composition of emigrants (i.e. skilled,
and unskilled migration). Using the migration database constructed by Defoort (2008)
and linking it to the international aid database (available from the OECD) we ﬁnd ev-
idence that on average aid is associated with the migration of the more educated. Our
ﬁnding is that 1% of GDP increase in aid induces (in the short run) a 7% increase in
skilled migration, and an increase in the selection rate of around 3% (i.e. the ratio high
to low skilled among emigrants and non emigrants). The eﬀect on skilled migration
in the long-run is much larger: a 1% of GDP increase in aid leads to an increase of
the steady-state skilled migration of about 11%. These results are robust to diﬀerent
identiﬁcation strategies and speciﬁcations. The eﬀect on the unskilled migration rate
is small (2.5% in case of a 1% of GDP increase in aid).
We also test some speciﬁc mechanisms to clarify the inﬂuence of aid on the selection
path of emigrants. Settled on the academic background provided by Roy (1951) and
Borjas (1987), a growing literature featuring evidence on the determinants of the varia-
tion in the quality of international immigrants by education level, such as Chiquiar and
Hanson (2008), Fern´ andez-Huertas (forthcoming) and Grogger and Hanson (2010), ﬁnd
that the major determinants of self selection among emigrants are the distribution of
income in the host and home country, and pecuniary and non-pecuniary moving costs,
which in turn depend on the skill level. In this framework, it is probable that inter-
national cooperation may inﬂuence the self-selection of emigrants, by helping to reduce
transaction costs (by providing opportunities for the highly skilled to migrate thanks
to the attribution of scholarship grants), and reduce informational costs (by providing
information on the donor countries). Through the diﬀerent projects in LDCs, besides of
providing information, aid also may create networks and screen high level professionals
(by providing direct contacts and opportunities for high quality native professionals
to be hired abroad). Moreover, since the costs to migrate may decrease (or increase)
4in skill level and aid may increase education at home, see Dreher et al. (2008), it is
very likely that international aid will encourage (or diminish) the emigration of the
highly skilled by improving the distribution of schooling in LDCs. Aid also may modify
incentives to migrate (by supporting growth, contributing to ﬁnance national incomes
and thus increase wages)1. Whether skilled or unskilled are more sensible to better
economic conditions is an empirical question.
At the present, when testing the complemental relation between aid and migration,
Berth´ elemy et al. (2009) suggest that skilled migrants are more sensitive to bilateral
aid, whereas unskilled migrants are more aﬀected by total aid. In a panel data frame-
work, we test more speciﬁc mechanisms and show that the immediate eﬀect of aid is
positive selection, and that skilled migration is more responsive than unskilled to aid
and to the diﬀerent mechanisms through which aid may aﬀect international migration.
As explained in section 5, due to data restrictions, we limit ourselves to test only direct
eﬀects. We hence test the eﬀect of technical cooperation (i.e. the part of aid consisting
in ﬁnancing scholarships, tuition fees, ticket ﬂights, living allowances, etc). Here we as-
sume overstaying of the fellows and conceive technical cooperation as a way to overcome
budget constraints and reduce transaction and information costs for the most skilled.
Second, we test the possibility of a positive eﬀect coming from strong links between
receipt and donor countries. Good relations are proxied by the proportion of bilateral
to total aid. We assume that, the larger this proportion for a receipt-donor countries
pair, the better the relations between them (compared to remaining donors). More
bilateral contacts thus reduce information costs easing migration. Third, we analyze
the eﬀect of project aid, that is those funds used to implement speciﬁc projects in which
allocation, ﬁnancing and management are controlled by the donors. This category of
aid provides direct contacts and opportunities for potential emigrants to work in donor
countries. Fourth, we test the eﬀect of the categories of aid delivered to improve educa-
tion. We assume that these categories improve the distribution of schooling. Whether
1Since the link between aggregate aid and growth is weak, we consider in the analysis those cate-
gories of aid, which were shown to be more related to growth. See details below
5more educated people are more prone to honor migration costs and thus emigrate, that
is costs are decreasing in skill level, is an empirical question. Finally, we test the ef-
fect of categories of aid which were shown to be more likely to support growth. These
categories of aid are developmental aid (Minoiu and Reddy , 2010), net aid (Gomanee
et al., 2005), and short run impact aid (Clemens et al., 2004). We assume that they
contribute to improve economic conditions in receipt countries, an thus induce (skilled
or unskilled) migration by helping to overcome budget constraints.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we provide a de-
scription of the data as well as some stylized facts. Section 3 presents the empirical
methodology designed. Section 4 displays the results. Some mechanisms are sketched
out and tested in section 5, whereas in section 6 we conclude.
2 Data and stylized facts
To measure migration we rely on Docquier and Marfouk (2006), and deﬁne the migration
rate for country i, as the ratio of the total number of working age individuals (older
than 25) with education level k, who were born in country i but live abroad, divided
by the total number of individuals (older than 25) of country i with education level
k. We consider that k is high (h) for tertiary education attainment, and low (l) for
less than tertiary level attainment. Note that in this deﬁnition, migration is considered
as percentage of the total labour force born in sending countries. From a practical
viewpoint, this “migration rate” (mk











i,t is the number of individuals of country i at time t (aged 25 or more)
with a level k of education who migrated and Nk
i,t is the number of these individu-
als who did not migrate. This ratio has been estimated by Docquier and Marfouk
(2006) for a large panel of countries for the years 1990 and 2000 for diﬀerent educa-
6tion levels. Defoort (2008) has extended this dataset to a broader period ranging from
1975 to 2000 for a set of 195 countries (with 5 years intervals). However, given the
complications associated with identifying foreigners in receiving countries (information
on the origin and skill of immigrants comes from national population censuses), they
calculate migration rates considering only the six major receivers (Australia, Canada,
France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States). These countries ac-
count for approximately 85% of South to North skilled migration (see Defoort, 2008).
Interestingly, these countries are also among the major aid donors, and account for ap-
proximately 60% of the total aid from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC)
countries. Thus, the skilled migration rate (mh
i,t), from Defoort (2008), is our ﬁrst vari-
able of interest. Moreover, we calculate the unskilled migration rate (ml
i,t), which is the
ratio of the proportion of migrants (Ml
i,t) from country i at time t with training level
l (obtained by subtracting Mh
i,t from Mk
i,t) over the total number of nationals with low
level education (Nl
i,t). Following Docquier et al. (2007), a rise in the migration rate by
education level k could be due to a rise in the level of migration among all education
level or to a speciﬁc rise in the ratio of the proportion of k level educated emigrants by
the same proportion among non-emigrants (represented by the selection rate). Thus
to consider these global migration eﬀects we also consider as dependent variable the
total migration rate (mk
i,t, for all k education level), also available from Defoort (2008)2.
In this way, the size of migration ﬂows by education level is measured by the skilled
migration rate, unskilled migration rate, and total migration rate.
Note that since only the population aged 25 years or over is considered in Defoort
(2008)’s dataset, it excludes from the sample a large number of students who migrated
to complete their education. One drawback of these migration indicators is that this
rate does not discriminate between place of training or date of departure. In addition
since it is constructed on population censuses, they do not take into account illegal
immigrants. It can therefore be that the actual level of migration is higher than what
2Total, skilled and unskilled migration rates are monotonically transformed by ln[m/1-m], following
Docquier et al. (2007). It expands the range of the variable from (0,1) to (−inf,+inf).
7is measured. This should however not be a major concern for our empirical ﬁndings
since, as we explain later, we control for country and time ﬁxed eﬀects.
Another measure we use is the selection rate. This variable can be seen as a measure














where si,t is the selection rate of sending country i to the hosting country j, in this
case represented by the six major receivers, at time t. The numerator in equation (2)
represents the skill ratio for emigrants, i.e. the share of skilled and unskilled emigrants
in receiving country j. The denominator represents the skill ratio for non migrants, i.e.
the share of skilled and unskilled non migrants. Positive values of the selection rate
means that emigrants are more educated than their non-migrant counterparts.
As far as foreign aid is concerned, we consider the Oﬃcial Development Assistance
(ODA) from the OECD. ODA is deﬁned as the ﬂow of grants and loans from donors
and multilateral institutions, provided by oﬃcial or executive agencies, to countries
of the DAC list. As it is commonly done in the literature, we quantify the ODA by
considering the net disbursements as a percentage of the Gross Domestic Product. Our
key variable of interest is “bilateral ODA” from the six donors for which migration rates
are available3, which is deﬁned as the ﬂows given directly by the government of one
country to another.
Before moving to the econometric analysis, it is interesting to look at the link
between international aid and migration using some raw data. For this purpose, we
plot, in Figure 1, the averaged over time skilled and selection rate (towards the 6 major
migrant receivers) of all LDCs against the international aid they receive (from the same
6 major countries). The scale of both axes is logarithmic and 95% conﬁdence intervals
are shaded. The upper panel of Figure 1 presents the relation between aid and skilled
3However, by considering aid provided by all donors leads to identical results, which is expected
given the large share of total aid provided by these 6 countries.
8migration. It turns out to be, as we expected, upward sloping. The lower panel of
Figure 1 presents the selection rate. Here again the slope of the regression line is,
as anticipated, positive. From this very preliminary analysis, it seems hence that aid
and the migration of workers belonging to the upper tail of the education distribution
are positively linked. We therefore expect that the more international aid, the more
educated are more likely to emigrate.
[Insert Graph here]




In our empirical analysis, we test for the link between international aid and our variables
of interest by estimating parameter γ in the relation
Yit = γAidit + Xitβ + δi + τt + εit with i = 1...n and t = 1....T (3)
Subscript i and t denote country and year respectively, Yit are the migration variables
of interest (i.e. skilled migration mh
it, unskilled migration ml
it, total migration mk
it, and
selection rate sit), Aidit is the ratio of international aid on Gross Domestic Product
(GDP), Xit is a matrix of control variables and δi and τt are the individual and time
ﬁxed eﬀects respectively. As far as aid is concerned, to ensure consistency with the
dependent variable, we only consider aid provided by the 6 major receivers of migrants.
The variables considered in Xit are those generally perceived in the literature as inducing
migration (with the exception of the time invariant ones that are accounted for in the
individual ﬁxed eﬀects). The variables included on Xit are: i) the lag of country i’s total
number of nationals living in the hosting countries, in order to control for a potential
9network or diaspora eﬀect, note that by controlling for ﬁxed eﬀects, this variable turns
out to be a good proxy for the change in migration policies of donor countries with
respect to country i since it conveys information on the gap between the total number
of migrants of country i (in year t) with respect to the time invariant number of migrants
from country i; ii) total population in the country of origin to capture the country i’s
size and potential migration; iii) the relative level of development and its squared value
(proxied by the Real GDP per capita) to capture a potential “inverted-U” relationship
between development and migration; iv) the percentage of individuals (over 25) with
tertiary level education living in country i to control for the level of education in sending
countries and (v) the Freedom House index as an aggregate indicator of social stability
that measure the degree of freedom, political rights and civil liberties. The description
and the source of these variables are presented in Table 1A in appendix.
It could be argued that by controlling for the level of education and income in period
t, we could be biasing the results in favour of a positive eﬀect of aid on migration by
removing an eventual indirect channel through which aid could inﬂuence migration. To
cope with this, we considered all control variables one (and ﬁve) year lagged, and the
generality of the results remain unaﬀected. We also considered aid in t − 1 to grasp
an eventual lag in the eﬀect. Here, again the generality of the results does not change.
Nevertheless, in section 4.3 we consider a more complete dynamic model to deal for a
series of possible leads and lags.
Empirical studies on migration generally try to identify the causes of resettlements
by calling on gravity models to separate pull eﬀects (i.e. migration outcomes associated
with the characteristics of the receiving countries) from push eﬀects (i.e. migration
outcomes associated with the characteristics of sending countries). Here, the goal is
diﬀerent. Our objective is to test whether international aid, coming from a given set of
OECD countries (which is the same for all aid receivers), modiﬁes the skill composition
of emigrants (towards them). Therefore the overall pull eﬀect will be controlled for
by introducing receiving country ﬁxed eﬀects. Additional “gap measures” such as the
10diﬀerence in the income level (in the migration equations), and in the distribution of
income between sending and hosting countries (in the selection equation), are controlled
by the time dummies. Any policy change from the donors towards international aid and
migration in general (independently of countries), and ﬁxed determinants of migration
like transportation costs (geographic distance or land border), and cultural ties (past
colonies and common language) are controlled by the country and time ﬁxed eﬀect.
The within estimator permit us also to control for illegal migrants by assuming that
the proportion of legal migrants is a normally distributed fraction of the total number
of migrants. So, deviations with respect to the mean (which is absorbed by the ﬁxed
eﬀects) will feed in the error term.
However simple two-way (country and time) ﬁxed eﬀects estimation is probably not
well suited here since the estimated parameter associated to aid might suﬀer from an
endogeneity bias. This bias is likely to exist since aid is considered, as stated in the in-
troduction, as a policy tool to reduce migration. The causality could hence be reversed.
Several case studies give evidence showing that this bias is likely to be important. La-
comba and Boni (2008), for example, show how Spain uses ODA to curb Morocco’s
immigration. Similarly Dayton-Johnson and Katseli (2006), show how the UK chan-
nels aid to Malawi with the purpose of reducing inﬂows of skilled migrants to Britain.
Given this endogeneity bias we need to call on instrumental variables estimation (IV).
3.2 Coping with endogeneity
The IV is a very powerful tool to correct for the endogeneity bias. However, for a satis-
factory result, it is necessary to ﬁnd good instruments, i.e. in our case, variables that are
highly correlated with aid but independent of ε in eq. (3). The literature on the sources
of variation in aid oﬀers several possible candidates for exogenous sources of variation
in aid. Unfortunately, most of them also explain migration directly and are therefore
not independent of the error term. Furthermore, most of these are constant over time
and are consequently not appropriate in a ﬁxed eﬀect framework. Nevertheless, we have
11identiﬁed a set of variables that could be helpful in this context.
The instruments we consider are related to “good policy”. The idea that aid is more
eﬀective if a country has better economic policies, as suggested by Burnside and Dollar
(2000), has inﬂuenced the assignment requirements in donor countries and has been
considered as a criterion in aid allocation policies. Evidence in favour of good policy
and performance requirements in aid assignment is presented by Berth´ elemy and Tichit
(2004) and Birdsall et al. (2003).
Thus, the ﬁrst instrument we consider is the ratio of the external debt over GDP.
This variable proxies the quality of macroeconomic policies implemented. The second
we use is inﬂation. This variable proxies both good monetary policy and good economic
performance. We believe both instruments to be exogenous since, though increasing the
future burden of debt and the annual percentage change in the consumer price index,
they do not induce any contemporaneous migration. They should furthermore not be
weak since donors are reluctant to provide aid to countries with poor macroeconomic
policies.
To test for the quality of our instruments, we use state of the art tests for underiden-
tiﬁcation, weak instruments and overidentiﬁcation (all the test considered are robust
to heteroskedasticity). More precisely, the underidentiﬁcation test is used to assess if
instruments are irrelevant. The test statistic is a Kleibergen-Paap rank LM statistic
which is distributed as a χ2
L where L is the number of instruments. The null hypothesis
is that there is underidentiﬁcation and instrumenting is ineﬃcient. The weak instru-
ments test is used to assess if instruments are suﬃciently correlated with the right hand
side endogenous variable (if this should not be the case, doubts could be casted on the
validity of the results). The test statistic is a Kleibergen-Paap rank Wald F-statistic 4.
The critical values are non standard but available from Stock and Yogo (2005). Two
null hypotheses can be tested using this statistic. The ﬁrst is that the relative bias of
instrumental variables with respect to that of OLS is smaller than 5% (which is quite
4Since the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic is not appropriate if heteroskedasticity is suspected.
12demanding since, as a rule of thumb, instruments are generally not considered as weak
if the relative bias is smaller than 20%). Second, that the relative size of the Wald test
based on the IV statistic is smaller than 10% (as before, instruments are generally not
considered as weak if the size is smaller than 20%).
Finally, to test for the “exogeneity” of the instruments we use the well-known Hansen
test. The joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are orthogonal to the errors.
Under the null, the test statistic is distributed as a χ2
L−k where k is the number of
endogenous explanatory variables and L, the number of instruments. A rejection of the
null points toward an endogeneity of the instruments.
A second objection that could be raised is that migration persistence might inﬂuence
the results and that some of the explanatory variables might not be strictly exogenous
as they could be related to lags of the dependent variable. We therefore also consider a
dynamic panel data model using the system GMM methodology developed by Blundell
and Bond (1998).
3.3 Coping with persistence
In the previous subsection we only considered the possible endogeneity of aid. However,
it could be argued that other biases could arise due to the correlation of other explana-
tory variables with the contemporaneous or the lagged error. An omitted variable bias
could hence arise from failing to control for the persistence of migration. There are
many channels through which past migration may impact current migration incentives.
For example, following Munshi (2003), past migration may induce additional migration
by increasing the probability of getting a job upon arrival at the destination country
thanks to diasporas. Past migration ﬂows can also inﬂuence migration rates through
family-reuniﬁcation policies. Similarly, as explained by Goldin (1994), the voting power
of naturalized immigrants may aﬀect immigration-policy outcomes of receiving countries
and consequently determine the structure of migration. Thus, neglecting persistence
may bias the results in migration’s speciﬁcations.
13Taking into account dynamics in the modelling also allows to control for changes in
some of the explanatory variables that might otherwise be diﬃcult to measure (such
as screening policy changes with respect to each country, income diﬀerentials and un-
employment rates). Dynamic models have the additional advantage of coping with
a potential lack of strict exogeneity of some of the control variables that might be
correlated with past errors (i.e. predetermined) or correlated with current errors (i.e.
endogenous). And permit us also to cope the endogeneity in aid calling on alternative
set of instruments. To control for persistence, we consider a dynamic panel model of
the type5:
mit = ρmit−1 + γAidit + Xitβ + δi + τt + εit with i = 1...n and t = 1....T (4)
As usual in dynamic panel data, this equation cannot be estimated by calling on a
within estimator since the demeaned lagged migration rate (mit−1 − ¯ mi.) is not inde-
pendent of the demeaned error term (εit − ¯ εi.), where ¯ mi. and ¯ εi. are the time average
of respectively the migration rate and the error term. To address this issue, we use the
“system GMM” estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998).
Originally, to deal with dynamic panel ﬁxed eﬀects, Arellano and Bond (1991) pro-
posed a “diﬀerence GMM” estimator that consists in taking the ﬁrst diﬀerence of all
variables and regressing diﬀerences on diﬀerences to remove the country ﬁxed eﬀects.
To cope with endogeneity, they suggest to instrument all diﬀerenced variables that are
not strictly exogenous with all their available lags in levels. One problem with this
estimator is that if the variables are close to a random walk, lagged levels are weak
instruments for ﬁrst diﬀerences. Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond
(1998) hence suggest extending this estimator to a “system GMM” by adding a series
5The selection equation it is not estimated by a dynamic model since there is not enough evidence
for persistence as the selection rate failed to pass the Arellano-Bond test for autoregressive correlation
in time, AR(1). Consequently, a dynamic estimator is not suited for this variable.
14of orthogonality conditions to the “diﬀerence GMM” estimator. More precisely, vari-
ables in levels are instrumented with suitable lags of their own ﬁrst diﬀerences. The idea
is that instead of taking the diﬀerence of the regressors to remove the ﬁxed eﬀects and
then instrumenting the transformed variable, it is possible to transform (diﬀerence) the
instruments (to make them exogenous to the ﬁxed eﬀects) and subsequently use this
transformed instrument to cope with endogeneity. In our setup, we consider the lag of
the migration rate and foreign aid as potentially endogenous and the number (stock)
of migrants, the level of education and income as predetermined6. For obvious reasons
of availability of data and time length between periods (i.e. 5 years), we only consider
one and two period lagged diﬀerences as instruments. The standard errors (robust to
heteroskedasticity and arbitrary patterns of autocorrelation within individuals) are re-
ported in parentheses using the Windmeijer (2005) ﬁnite-sample correction. We only
present the results associated with the two-step GMM. However the results of the one
step system-GMM are broadly identical.
4 Results
We present our results in Table 1. The structure of the table is the following: there are
four blocks of three columns. Each block corresponds to one of the dependent variables
described above (i.e. selection rate, skilled migration rate, unskilled migration rate and
total migration rate). In each block the estimated coeﬃcients associated with each of
the estimators considered, Fixed Eﬀects (FE), two stages least squares (IV) and System
GMM (GMM), are reported in separate columns. The standard errors of the coeﬃcients
(that are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by country) are presented just
below the estimated parameters between brackets. To simplify the reading, we identify
signiﬁcant parameters at level 1%, 5% and 10% with respectively three, two and one
star.
6However the results are not sensitive to changes between predetermined and endogenous.
15At the bottom of the table, we report some test statistics and measures of goodness
of ﬁt. More speciﬁcally we report i) the within R2 for the two-way ﬁxed eﬀect model;
ii) the Kleibergen-Paap rank LM test statistic for underiﬁentiﬁcation, the Hansen J
test statistic for overidentifying restrictions and the Kleibergen-Paap rank Wald test
statistic for weakness of instruments in two-stages least squares and iii) the Hansen C
test statistic for the validity of the additional instruments used in the “system GMM”
estimator with respect to the simple “diﬀerence GMM”. For the GMM estimator, we
also present the Arellano-Bond z test statistic for autocorrelation to check if a dynamic
panel estimator is well suited.
[Insert Table 1 here]
From Table 1, it emerges that foreign bilateral aid is positively correlated with
skilled migration and the self selection of emigrants in LDCs. An increase in bilateral
development assistance of 1% of GDP of sending countries leads to an increase in skilled
migration of about 7%, and to an increase in the selection rate of about 3%, i.e. foreign
aid is positively correlated with the self selection of emigrants belonging to the upper
tail of the education distribution. As far as the long-run eﬀect of a change in policy is
considered (estimated by
γ
1−ρ following Pesaran and Smith, 2006), we see that a 1% of
GDP increase in total bilateral aid produces a rise in the steady-state skilled migration
of 10.25%. The regression related to unskilled migration, reported in the third block,
show that higher levels of foreign aid are also associated with less educated emigrants,
though the eﬀect is about half of that coming from skilled migration. Fourth block shows
that aid is positively associated to total migration, which brings additional evidence to
the complementarity between aid and migration. And suggests, following Docquier et
al. (2007), that aid induces skilled migration by both widening the schooling gap and
rising the level of migration among all education level.
As can be seen from the tests at the bottom of the table, our instruments are both
strong and exogenous, and IV estimation allows us to signiﬁcantly reduce the size of the
ﬁxed eﬀect endogeneity downward bias. The estimated eﬀects of bilateral aid obtained
16using “system-GMM” are comparable in sign and in signiﬁcativity to those obtained
with IV. The autoregressive term is signiﬁcant and of size 0.5 approximately for skilled,
and 0.7 for unskilled migration. The remaining tests allow us to conclude that our
results are not overidentiﬁed and that the use of both lags and diﬀerence instruments
are correct.
The sign of the additional regressors is in line with the literature on the determinants
of migration. The coeﬃcient associated to the lag of the number of immigrants provides
additional support for the importance of social networks in explaining migration ﬂows.
The sign of this coeﬃcient for the selection rate is negative and thus in agreement with
the recent ﬁndings of McKenzie and Rapoport (2007). Negative self-selection seems to
occur in regions with high migration networks and vice versa. Regarding the eﬀects
of education, we ﬁnd that an increase in the level of education at home generates a
less than proportional increase in the education level of emigrants. Similar results
were found by Docquier et al. (2007). Concerning income, the sign and signiﬁcance
of the coeﬃcients related to the linear and a quadratic term of the real income per
worker in the skilled and unskilled migration equation, suggest an inverted U-shaped
relation between development and skilled migration but not between development and
unskilled migration. As far as country size is concerned, our ﬁndings conﬁrm that it is
a key determinant of migration, the sign states that an increase in population generates
a less than proportional increase in emigration. Finally, regarding the socio political
environment, the estimated coeﬃcients associated with the Freedom index suggests that
skilled migrants are more sensitive to civil liberties (in a country) than unskilled ones.
To test the robustness of our results, we ﬁrst re-estimate our empirical models with
ten year horizons. We also add a large number of covariates to our initial model. For the
sake of clarity we only present, in Table 2, the coeﬃcients associated to aid. Complete
tables are available from the authors upon request. The description and the source of
the data for these variables are summarized in Table 1A in the appendix. The additional
variables considered are: i) life expectancy and mortality rate, as additional measures
17of economic development in sending countries, ii) potential migratory population, i.e.
population between 15 and 59 year old, to control for prospective demographic push
eﬀect, iii) internal conﬂicts and ethnical tensions, to control for the driving eﬀect of
insecurity in sending countries, iv) foreign direct investment inﬂows and trade openness
to take into account the fact that economic liberalization is believed to oﬀset migration
by generating development, v) and an alternative measure of democracy (to the Freedom
House index), the well-known Polity IV index of democracy.
[Insert Table 2 here]
As can be seen in Table 2, the results found in Table 1 about the eﬀect of aid on our
migration rates and the selection rate are not sensitive to these changes in speciﬁcations.
But in some cases unskilled migration is not signiﬁcant with IV.
5 Analysis of the mechanisms
In this section we try to identify the link between aid and migration and suggest some
mechanisms through which foreign aid may exert an eﬀect on the size and skill compo-
sition of emigrants.
The mechanisms driving the composition of migration with respect to skill level
have been studied for a long time. Borjas (1987), stated that diﬀerent self-selection
patterns with respect to education levels may be observed depending on whether the
wage skill proﬁle is steeper at origin or destination. By assuming constant migration
costs in the skill level of individuals, Borjas (1987) concludes that in countries with
relatively high returns to education and earnings inequality, immigrants are drawn
primarily from the lower half of the skill distribution of their home country. In addition
to income diﬀerentials, recent work by Chiquiar and Hanson (2005), Fern´ andez-Huertas
(forthcoming), highlight that diﬀerent self-selection patterns with respect to education
levels may also be observed depending on migration costs. These authors show that
depending on the size and distribution of migration costs with respect to skill, emigrants
18may come from the lower, intermediate or upper half of the education distribution even
if earnings inequality is high in sending countries7.
In this framework, it is unlikely that international cooperation may inﬂuence the se-
lection of emigrants by aﬀecting the distribution of rewards to skill in LDCs. However,
aid my help to ease migration costs in several ways: i) Aid may reduce transaction costs
by providing opportunities for the highly skilled to migrate thanks to the attribution
of scholarship grants, and ii) reduce informational costs by providing information on
donor countries, as aid creates bridges between the receiving and the donor countries.
iii) Aid may also create networks and screen high level professionals by providing direct
contacts and opportunities for top workers to get a job abroad. iv) Moreover, since the
structure of migration costs with respect to skill level can give rise to diﬀerent migra-
tion patterns, and aid may increase education at home (see for example Dreher et.al,
2008). Consequently, it is plausible that international aid will encourage (diminish)
the emigration of the highly educated, in case the cost is decreasing (increasing) in
skill levels, by improving the distribution of schooling in LDCs. v) Finally, although
international cooperation may not inﬂuence the wage skill proﬁle, aid may modify in-
centives to migrate by supporting growth, contributing to ﬁnance national incomes and
thus increase wages (see details below). There is evidence showing that if aid does
fosters development, it induces migration, see Rotte and Vogler (2000) and Berth´ elemy
et al. (2009). However, the aggregate eﬀect on self-selection is unknown, an increase
in LDCs’ wages may help willing unskilled or skilled emigrants to bear the costs of
migration (overcome budget constraints), but it may also incentivate people to stay at
home. Whether skilled or unskilled are more sensible to changes in income it is an em-
pirical question. Orrenius and Zavodny (2005), for example, ﬁnd that better economic
conditions in Mexico provide a greater disincentive to migrate among undocumented
skilled Mexicans than among the undocumented unskilled.
7Similarly, McKenzie and Rapoport (2007) enhance the role of migration costs and suggest that
high (low) migration networks, by reducing (increasing) costs, induce negative (positive) selection. At
cross country level, Grogger and Hanson (2010) highlight the role of absolute wages diﬀerences and
ﬁxed costs in inﬂuencing selectivity of international migration ﬂows, see also Belot and Hatton (2008).
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mechanisms that may explain the eﬀect of aid on migration selection. The approach
adopted follows that of the aid eﬀectiveness literature. Aid pursues multiple objectives
when granted to developing countries, and diﬀerent types of aid are likely to have diﬀer-
ent economic outcomes, some of them associated to migration. Therefore, we disaggre-
gate aid into speciﬁc-purpose categories that are more likely aﬀecting the mechanisms
described previously and test the direct eﬀect of aid categories on migration8.
We start by testing the eﬀect of aid on migration seeing it as a tool to overcome
liquidity constraints and reduce transaction costs, mainly for the highly skilled, through
the attribution of scholarship grants, tuition fees, tickets ﬂight, etc., by donor countries.
This brings an undeniable opportunity and incentives for many students and profession-
als to go abroad. Recently, the IOM (2008) stated that international students represent
around 20% of the skilled migration. To test this mechanism we check for the direct
eﬀect of bilateral technical cooperation on the selection rate and on the skill composition
of emigrants. During the period 1990-2006 technical cooperation represented annually
in average 24% of ODA net disbursements, OECD (2007). We assume that overstaying
is rather high (the OECD (2008) states that at best 15-20% of granted graduates may
be staying on in OECD countries).
We also test the eﬀect of aid on migration by considering the bilateral relation
between donor and recipient countries either by projects or by diplomatic vias, which
creates opportunities for contacts between both countries, easing access to information
about requirements and labour market conditions in donor countries, and reducing
procedure costs to the attainment of legal permissions. Hence, we expect that the
better the relations between donor and recipient countries, the higher the reduction in
these transaction and information costs (specially for educated workers) and the easier
the ways to migrate. To test this mechanism, we use as an indicator of the closeness
8Since we cannot consider aid as exogenous, testing indirect mechanisms while taking care of the
endogeneity between aid and migration, turned highly demanding in terms of excluded restrictions,
either by estimating two stage least squares with two endogenous variables (aid and the mechanism,
e.g. income) or a system of three equations. Thus we leave open this endeavor for future research.
20between donor and recipient countries, the proportion of bilateral aid from donor j
to total aid received from all DAC donors. Higher values of this ratio for a speciﬁc
recipient-donor pair may be understood as better links for that pair, compared to all
remaining donors. Furthermore, we test the eﬀect of aid considering it as mechanism
to provide information, create networks and screen high level native professionals. We
use for that project aid (funds used to implement speciﬁc projects in which allocation,
ﬁnancing and management are controlled by the donors). More project interventions
may be related to better information for natives on donor countries, more contacts and
networks, and more opportunities for the top educated workers to be employed abroad.
Moreover, since migration costs may decrease (increase) in the skill level of indi-
viduals, we test the direct eﬀect of the categories of aid which may improve the skill
distribution at home and thus induce (diminish) skilled migration. We consider for that,
aid targeted to education and its 5 year lag since the eﬀect may not be immediate. This
category corresponds to aid related with education plus technical cooperation. We add
technical cooperation, since it includes resources aimed at the transfer of skills (train-
ing, research, inter-university cooperation) and of technologies, which may improve the
quality of students and professionals in LDCs.
Finally, another speciﬁc mechanism through which aid may inﬂuence self-selection
is by modifying incentives to migrate via income. It is however still not clear what is
the eﬃciency of aggregate aid in sustaining growth (see Rajan and Subramanian, 2008).
Some authors have presented evidence showing that categories of aid related with the
support of development exert a positive eﬀect on growth, see Clemens et al. (2004),
Gomanee et al. (2005), Minoiu and Reddy (2010). As a consequence assuming that
aid targeted exclusively to promote development is supporting growth, contributing to
ﬁnancing the gross national income in recipient countries and thus increasing wages,
aid may (dis)incentive new emigrants. For testing the eﬀect of developmental aid on
migration selection we use many proxies.
i) To begin with, we consider Net aid from the six donors which, following Gomanee
21et al. (2005), is deﬁned as ODA disbursements minus food aid and humanitarian non
food aid9. We also consider ii) Developmental aid which, following Minoiu and Reddy
(2010), is deﬁned as the part of ODA disbursements highly associated with development
enhancement. This variable is not readily available but is generally proxied by the
aid donated by Scandinavian countries. And, iii) Early impact aid which, according
to Clemens et al. (2004), is deﬁned as the part of aid that has short-term eﬀects.
Broadly speaking, early-impact aid is budgetary support while long-run aid is related
to infrastructure investments and social aid. iv) It could be argued that the results may
be managed by the use of bilateral ﬂows instead of total aid as explanatory variable.
Hence, as a complement, we consider total inﬂows of aid (ODA) from overall DAC
donors. v) We also focus on Chang et al. (1999) and their criticism on the potential
overstating in the level of assistance by ODA. We hence examine the eﬀect of aid
measured by the Eﬀective Development Assistance (EDA) from DAC donors, i.e. the
sum of grants and the grant equivalents of oﬃcial loans.
The instrument setup, following the order described above, is as follows: Instruments
used for technical cooperation are the external debt to GDP, inﬂation and the annual
growth of M2 (Good policy). Instruments used for the proportion of bilateral to total
aid are population density (Economic interests, availability of natural resources) and
population 65 years old on (Development). Instruments used for project aid are M2 to
GDP (good environment to ﬁnance projects), Government Fractionalization and Cor-
ruption (A fractionalized and corrupt government creates incentives to provide project
aid, for a benevolent donor. And creates incentives to provide budget support in ex-
change for political concessions for a self-interested donor. See Bueno de Mesquita and
Smith, 2007). Instruments used for aid to education are the external debt to GDP,
inﬂation (Good policy), and the gross primary school enrollment (Need for aid to edu-
cation). Instruments used for Net aid, Developmental aid, as well as for Total aid are
the proportion of external debt to GDP, and inﬂation (Good policy). Instruments used
9Note that Gomanee et al. (2005) also excludes Technical Cooperation, but we still include it
because it might be correlated with skilled migration
22for EDA and Early impact aid are the proportion of external debt to GDP, the anual
growth of M2 (Good policy).
All instruments for equations corresponding to net aid, developmental aid, early-
impact aid, project aid, total aid, and EDA, pass the statistical tests of under, weak
and overidentiﬁcation. However the mix of instruments used for remaining equations
are rather weak (ﬁrst-stage F-stat slightly larger than 10)10. Thus, following Stock and
Yogo (2005), by using IV, these estimates may exhibit severe ﬁnite-sample biases, and
their ﬁnite-sample distribution may be very diﬀerent from their asymptotic distribution,
misrepresenting the size of tests and the range of conﬁdence intervals. To address this
we opt to use in addition to IV, the Fuller’s modiﬁed limited information maximum-
likelihood estimator (Fliml), Fuller (1977). As shown by Hahn et al. (2004), Flores-
Lagunes (2007), these estimators perform better overall with weak instruments. The
Fliml estimator belongs to the so called k-class estimators and sets k = λ− ˜ α/(N −L),
where λ is the liml eigenvalue, L = number of instruments, and ˜ α corresponds to the
Fuller parameter constant. The Fuller estimator with ˜ α=1 yields the best unbiased
estimator and is recommended when one wants to test hypotheses; the Fuller with ˜ α=4
estimator minimizes the mean squared error of the estimator. We report estimations
based on both Fuller constants 1 and 4. Panel A of Table 3 shows that using either of
these Fuller estimators produces estimates that are quite similar to the IV estimates.
The structure of Table 3 is as follows: there are three blocks corresponding to our
three dependent variables of interest. In each block the coeﬃcients of aid associated
with each of the estimators considered are reported in separate columns. There are two
sections, panel A contains the variables estimated by the Fuller’s limited information
maximum-likelihood estimator. Whereas inside panel B we ﬁnd estimations based on
FE, IV and GMM, respectively. Below the estimated parameters between brackets
robust standard errors are presented, followed by either the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald
F statistic for weak instruments in case IV is implemented, or the Hansen C statistic
10Although these values succeed the rule of thumb criterion of around 10, we are aware of our results
since these values don’t succeed properly the Stock-Yogo weak identiﬁcation test critical values.
23in case GMM is implemented.
[Insert Table 3 here]
As can be seen in the ﬁrst block, technical cooperation and our three proxies for
developmental aid present a signiﬁcative and positive eﬀect on the selection rate, there-
fore they are expanding the education gap between emigrants and non emigrants in
LDCs. However, bilateral relations and project aid don’t feature any eﬀect on the se-
lection rate, since their eﬀect on skilled migration is very small for bilateral relations
and non signiﬁcant for project aid. Likewise, aid targeted to education doesn’t feature
any signiﬁcant eﬀect on the selection rate. This result suggests that aid to education
by improving the skill distribution is supporting the ﬂow of highly educated emigrants
and improving the level of educated natives (non-emigrants) simultaneously. Thus, the
aggregate eﬀect on the diﬀerence in the skill ratio between emigrants and non migrants
is not distinguishable.
In the second and third block we can evidence that the coeﬃcients corresponding
to technical cooperation, the proxy for bilateral relations, aid to education, and our
proxies for developmental aid, are positively associated to skilled migration, but not
to unskilled migration. Project aid is non signiﬁcant, suggesting that the network and
screenning mechanism is not inﬂuencing either skilled or unskilled migration. Therefore,
foreign aid through technical cooperation, likewise major formal links between donors
and recipient countries, may help to reduce transaction and information costs for highly
educated workers and in this way ease skilled migration. Furthermore, the signiﬁcativity
and sign of the coeﬃcients associated to aid targeted to education show that migration
costs are decreasing in skill levels, that is in case aid improves education, it facilitates
the honor of costs just for educated people and induce thus skilled migration. The sign
of the lag of aid to education suggests that an increase in the education level of the
population (via aid) in developing countries increases skilled migration in the short run,
but in the medium run (here ﬁve years) it will reduce the education level of emigrants11.
11Docquier et al. (2007) suggest that an increase in the education level generates a less than pro-
portional increase in the skilled migration.
24Finally, considering the coeﬃcients associated to aid targeted to development, rows 2
to 4 of Panel B shows that skilled workers are more responsive to better economic
conditions than unskilled workers, that is the immediate eﬀect of an increase in aid
would be to contribute the overcoming of budget constraints to skilled emigrants.
These results are slightly contradictory to the ﬁndings in Berth´ elemy et al. (2009),
since they suggest that unskilled people are more sensible to changes in income (by
relaxing budget constraints). This conclusion comes from their larger eﬀect of total aid
on unskilled migration compared to the eﬀect on skilled migration. Thereby, in rows
5 and 6 of Panel B we use total aid (ODA) and EDA coming from all DAC donors
as explanatory variables, as can be seen the results are similar to that obtained using
bilateral proxies, that is a larger and more signiﬁcant eﬀect of aid on skilled migration
than on unskilled migration. Hence, based in overall our results, we state that the
immediate eﬀect of foreign aid is an increase in the ﬂow of skilled emigrants and a
widening of the education gap between emigrants and natives (brain drain).
6 Conclusions
The skill characteristics of emigrants, self-selection, determine the characteristics for
the impact of migration. Many international agencies and OECD countries suggest
using oﬃcial aid programs to improve development and reduce push factors behind
both skilled and unskilled migration.
Using recently compiled panel data on international migration by education attain-
ment (from Defoort, 2008) we analyzed the impact of aid on the skill bias of migration
(self-selection), and on the skill composition of emigrants (skilled and unskilled migra-
tion). The empirical results point toward a signiﬁcant relation between aid and positive
self-selection among international emigrants. The eﬀect on skilled migration is larger
and more signiﬁcant than the eﬀect on unskilled migration.
Moreover, we assessed the possible mechanisms through which foreign aid may exert
25an eﬀect on the skill composition of migration. We found that technical cooperation
exerts a role in reducing transaction and information costs for educated people, since
it is positively linked with skilled migration and the positive selection of emigrants.
We also found that better receipt-donor bilateral relations (by reducing information
costs) are also favouring skilled migration. Likewise, aid targeted to improve education
level in sending countries, by easing the honor of migration costs, also induces skilled
migration in developing countries. This may suggest that costs are decreasing in skill
level (Chiquiar and Hanson, 2005). Finally, we found that the immediate eﬀect of aid
targeted to development would be to contribute the overcoming of budget constraints
to skilled migrants. This result suggests that skilled migrants are more sensitive to
changes in income than unskilled migrants.
In consequence, given the result of this analysis, we remain skeptical as to the idea
supported by international agencies that retention of skilled workers can be achieved
via aid. However, data availability issues only allow us to study a reduced form. We
therefore consider this paper a starting point for much needed further research on this
topic.
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The log of the proportion of immigrants with less than tertiary edu-




Net disbursements of Oﬃcial Development Assistance (ODA) , in-
cluding grants and loans, provided by the six donor countries consid-
ered (as a % of GDP, both in current U.S. dollars).
OECD, DAC
Lag Migrants The lagged value of the log of the total number of immigrants in the
six OECD countries.
Defoort, 2008






Population Log of the Total population resident in a country (in thousands). UNPD
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Freedom House 7 points Index. It considers political rights and civil







Log of the number of years a newborn infant would live if prevailing
patterns of mortality throughout his life.
WDI, 2007
Mortality rate Log of the Infant mortality rate, that is the number of infants who





Proportion of people aged between 15 and 59 years old. UNDP
Internal con-
ﬂicts
An index of political violence in a country. The highest rating means
there is no armed or civil opposition to the government. The lowest




An index of the degree of tension within a country attributable to
racial, nationality, or language divisions. Higher ratings means the
tensions are minimal.
ICRG
FDI Net inﬂows of Foreign direct investment (as a % of GDP, both in
current U.S. dollars).
WDI, 2007
Openess Log of the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured
as a share of the GDP.
WDI, 2007
Polity IV The institutionalized Democracy indicator (0-10). Larger values
mean better competitiveness of executive recruitment, better con-





Total debt owed to nonresidents (as a % of GDP, both in current U.S.
dollars).
WDI, 2007
Inﬂation Annual percentage change in the consumer price index of acquiring
a ﬁxed basket of goods and services.
WDI, 2007
M2 growth Average annual growth rate in money and quasi money (in %). WDI, 2007
Primary edu-
cation
The log of the 5 years average of the gross primary school enrollment. WDI, 2003
Old popula-
tion
Proportion of individuals ageing 60 years old (in %). UNDP
Density Proportion of people per square kilometers WDI, 2007
M2 to GDP Money and quasi money as a % of the GDP WDI, 2007
Gov. Frac-
tionalization
The probability that two deputies picked at random from among the
government parties will be of diﬀerent parties
DPI, 2009
Corruption An assessment of corruption within the political system. A score of
6 points equates to very low corruption level and a score of 0 points




Includes grants related with education or training at home or abroad,
and payments to consultants as well as teachers and administrators
serving in recipient countries. Measured as a % of GDP. Transformed
in disbursements by applying their percentage share (in total com-
mitments) to total disbursements from the six donors considered.
OECD, CRS
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Aid related with education training, education policy and manage-
ment, and research. Code 110 in the CRS commitments database.
Plus technical cooperation. Measured as a % of GDP. Transformed
in disbursements by applying their percentage share (in total com-




Proportion of bilateral aid provided by the six donors countries con-
sidered associated to the total aid provided by all donors.
OECD, DAC
Project Aid Sector-speciﬁc aid. Codes I to IV in the CRS commitments database.
Transformed in disbursements by applying their percentage share (in
total commitments) to total disbursements from the six donors con-
sidered
OECD, CRS
Net Aid Net disbursements of ODA that do not include Food and Humani-




Following Minoiu and Reddy (2010) the proxy corresponds to ODA
disbursements coming from the Scandinavian donors: Denmark, Fin-





Following Clemens et al. (2004), early impact aid corresponds to
budget support and project aid given for real sector investments in
infrastructure and productive sectors (as a % of GDP, both in current
U.S. dollars).
OECD, CRS
EDA Flows of aid, excluding Technical Cooperation and accounting for
diﬀerents degrees of concesionality in Loans (Grant element), as a %





Net disbursements of Oﬃcial Development Assistance (ODA) , in-
cluding grants and loans, provided by all DAC donors (as a % of





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































37Figure 1: International aid and Migration.
38